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Symposium Articles
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL CONTRACTION
AND ANTITRUST LAW
JOHN T. WOLOHAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 6, 2001, two days after one of the most memora-
ble World Series in recent baseball history, Bud Selig, the Commis-
sioner of Major League Baseball ("MLB"), announced that two
teams may be eliminated, or "contracted," from the league before
the start of the 2002 season.' This would be MLB's first contraction
since the 1899 season when the National League cut the number of
teams from twelve to eight by disbanding baseball franchises in Bal-
timore, Cleveland, Louisville, and Washington. 2 Before Selig had
the opportunity to name the two teams, however, baseball's plans to
contract were diverted.3
Within days of Selig's announcement, two lawsuits were filed in
Minnesota and Florida challenging the owners' rights to contract
the two teams. 4 In addition, the Major League Baseball Players As-
* John T. Wolohan is an Associate Professor for the Ithaca College Sport
Management Program at Ithaca College in Ithaca, New York. He received his B.A.
in 1985 from the University of Massachusetts in Amherst and attained his J.D. in
1992 at Western New England College School of Law.
1. See Jack Bell, Major League Soccer Eliminates Two Teams, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2002, at D6 (explaining that Major League Soccer utilized contraction to solve
economic problems). At the same time baseball announced its plans to contract
two teams, Major League Soccer also announced plans to contract two teams from
its league. See id. Soccer was able to contract two teams, Miami and Tampa Bay
(two markets also under consideration by baseball). See id.
2. See HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARs 3-4 (Oxford Univ. Press,
Inc. 1989) (1960) (explaining origins of professional baseball from colonial era
through 1980s). Baseball emerged from a casual pastime into a highly profitable,
rapidly growing business. See id.
3. See Richard Sandomir, Selig Defends His Plan of Contraction to Congress, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 7, 2001, at S3 (explaining that Major League Baseball Commissioner
appeared before Congress to explain why contracting two professional baseball
teams was necessary).
4. See Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v. Minn. Twins P'ship, 638 N.W.2d 214,
219 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (declaring that Minnesota Twins, one of teams sought
to be eliminated by contraction, was under contract to play in public stadium dur-
ing season, thus forcing team to play at stadium in accordance with agreement); see
also Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (N.D. Fla.
2001) (ruling because baseball is exempt from antitrust laws, Florida's Attorney
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sociation ("MLBPA") filed a grievance with arbitrator Shyam Das
claiming that the owners violated the collective bargaining agree-
ment.5 One final consequence of Selig's announcement was that
Senator Paul Wellstone, a Minnesota Democrat, and Representative
John Conyers of Michigan, the senior Democrat on the House Judi-
ciary Committee, introduced bills in Congress designed to prevent
baseball from retaining its exemption from antitrust laws. 6 Unable
to clear all the legal hurdles before the start of the 2002 season,
Commissioner Selig announced that baseball was postponing the
contraction until further notice. 7
Despite the postponement of baseball's contraction plans, the
application of federal and state antitrust laws to future contractions
remains an issue. For example, although baseball traditionally has
been exempt from antitrust laws due to the precedent set in three
United States Supreme Court cases, there is some debate over the
scope of the exemption.8 In the thirty years since the Supreme
Court last considered the issue, the changing environment of base-
ball has clouded a once black and white issue. This is particularly
true since Congress passed the Curt Flood Act 9 in 1998 and intro-
duced the Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of
General could not prevent proposed contraction of baseball team with civil investi-
gative demands). The Major League Baseball Players Association filed a grievance
accusing the owners of unfair labor practices. See Hal Bodley, Union Files Grievance
over MLB Contraction, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 2001, at IC. While no cities were named,
most speculation centered on the Montreal Expos and the Minnesota Twins. See
id.; see also Hal Bodley, Answvers to Your Questions About Eliminating MLB Teams, USA
TODAY, Nov. 6, 2001, at 4C. The Florida Marlins and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays
were mentioned also as possible teams. See id. But see Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n,
638 N.W.2d at 230 (awarding Twins exemption from contraction for one year due
to contract with stadium).
5. While there was plenty of debate on how the arbitrator would have decided
this grievance, no decision was reached. As part of the new collective bargaining
agreement, both Major League Baseball and the players association agreed to drop
the grievance.
6. See Sandomir, supra note 3, at S3. When called to testify before the House
Judiciary Committee on December 6, 2001, Commissioner Selig testified that Ma-
jor League Baseball teams lost a total of $519 million in 2001. See id.
7. See Hal Bodley, No Teams to Fold Before '03; MLB Owners, Players Close to Agree-
ment, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 2001, at IC (explaining potential settlement between
baseball players and owners included stipulation that players union would drop
grievance attempting to block contraction).
8. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (declaring baseball exempt
from antitrust regulations although negotiations in baseball players' contract
lacked mutuality); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (finding base-
ball not restricted by federal antitrust laws); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v.
Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (holding need for
interstate travel for baseball exhibition games did not subject professional baseball
to federal antitrust laws under Sherman Antitrust Act).
9. The Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 27a (2000).
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CONTRACTION AND ANTITRUST LAw
2001,10 both of which have the specific intent of limiting baseball's
antitrust exemption.
This article examines whether circumstances surrounding pro-
fessional sports have changed enough to allow the courts to apply
antitrust laws to baseball. It begins with a brief overview of base-
ball's antitrust exemption. It then inspects the potential impact of
the Curt Flood Act of 1998 and the Fairness in Antitrust in National
Sports (FANS) Act of 2001 as relevant to contraction. Finally, the
paper explores the present state of baseball's antitrust protection
under the microscope of contraction.
II. THE HISTORY OF BASEBALL AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw"I
Historically, the courts have held MLB exempt from antitrust
laws. 12 This section examines how courts traditionally have treated
MLB under federal antitrust laws. The subsequent portion dis-
cusses baseball's "Supreme Court trilogy" and then examines some
cases that followed.
A. Baseball's Supreme Court Antitrust Trilogy
The first case in baseball's Supreme Court antitrust trilogy was
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs.'3 Under the leadership of James Gilmore, the Federal
League in 1913 announced that it intended to establish itself as a
third major league. 14 Beginning in 1914, the Federal League,
which was run like a syndicate, 15 began to compete against both the
American League and National League in the same cities.' 6 After
10. Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R
3288 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001).
11. For a detailed review of baseball and antitrust law, see John T. Wolohan,
The Curt Flood Act of 1998 and Major League Baseball's Federal Antitrust Exemption, 9
MARQ2. SPORTS LJ. 347 (1999).
12. See Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1322
(N.D. Fla. 2001) (reaffirming baseball's antitrust exemption despite numerous law-
suits regarding questionable negotiating practices).
13. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
14. See generally DAVID S. NEFF & RictARD M. COHEN, THE SPORTS ENCYCLOPE-
DtA: BASEBALL (15th ed. 1995) (depicting history of baseball, including politics and
economics necessary to establish Federal League).
15. See id. The league was run much like the Women's National Basketball
League and Major League Soccer are today, with the players hired by the league
and not the teams.
16. See id. The league started in 1914 with teams in Baltimore, Buffalo, Brook-
lyn, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Indianapolis, and Pittsburgh. Indianapolis was
replaced in 1915 by Newark. See id.; see also LEE LOWENFISH, THE IMPERFECT DIA-
MOND: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS 90 (DaCapo Press, Inc. 1991) (1980).
20031
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two years of competition, however, the Federal League and MLB
were ready to reach a settlement. In December 1915, the Ameri-
can, National, and Federal Leagues negotiated the "Peace Agree-
ment," which ultimately dissolved the Federal League. 17
The Peace Agreement compensated the members of the Fed-
eral League in three ways. First, the Federal League received
$600,000.18 Second, the Agreement permitted two of its owners to
buy existing major league teams. 19 Finally, dissolved teams were al-
lowed to sell their players' contracts to the highest bidding major
league team.211
The agreement, however, contained no provisions for Balti-
more's dissolved Federal League team.2 1 Thus, with no league to
play in after the Peace Agreement, the owners of the Baltimore
team filed an antitrust suit against the remaining baseball leagues
alleging that organized baseball had conspired to monopolize base-
ball and had committed violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.22
Specifically, Baltimore argued that MLB "destroyed the Federal
League by buying up some of the constituent clubs and in one way
or another inducing all those clubs... to leave their League .... ,,23
A federal district court ruled in the former Baltimore team's favor
17. See Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Bait.,
Inc., 269 F. 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (involving lawsuit between former members
of Federal League alleging National and American Leagues violated Sherman An-
titrust Act).
18. See LOWENFISH, supra note 16, at 91 (explaining conditions of 1916 Peace
Agreement settlement, including $600,000 compensation for Federal League in
exchange for dropping lawsuit seeking injunctive relief sought to prevent Federal
League's dissolution).
19. See id. Charles Weeghman and Phil Ball obtained ownership of the Major
League Baseball teams in the Peace Agreement settlement. See id. Weeghman
became the primary stockholder of the Chicago Cubs. See id. Phil Ball became the
owner of the American League's St. Louis baseball team. See id.
20. See id. Harry Sinclair was owner of the Federal League's Kansas City team,
which he relocated to Newark, NewJersey in 1915. See id. at 90. The Peace Agree-
ment prevented Sinclair from becoming the owner of New York's market team. See
id. at 91. In return, Sinclair received $35,000 for trading Benny Kauff, the Federal
League's leading hitter. See id.
21. See id. (noting that Baltimore Federal League team received no benefits
from 1916 settlement). Baltimore franchise owners Ned Hanlon and Harry
Goldman began suit against the National and American Leagues, Weeghman, and
Gilmore for antitrust violations. See id.
22. See id. (indicating professional baseball was subject to antitrust laws).
Hanlon and Goldman claimed that actions to prevent their ownership of profes-
sional baseball, undertaken by National League, American League, Weeghman,
and ball teams, were antitrust violations. See id.
23. Fed. Baseball Club of Bait. v. Nat'l League of Prof'I Baseball Clubs, Inc.,
259 U.S. 200, 207 (1922) (holding interstate exhibition baseball games did not
constitute interstate commerce).
[Vol. 10: p. 5
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and awarded it $240,000 in treble damages, costs, and attorney
fees. 24
On appeal, the district court's decision was overturned. The
court of appeals, citing American League Baseball Club of Chicago v.
Chase,25 held that the game of baseball was not a trade or com-
merce.26 It noted that baseball's exhibitions "[were] local in [their]
beginning and in [their] end."27 Accordingly, baseball did not con-
stitute a localized entity under the Sherman Antitrust Act.28
The United States Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's
decision, holding that the business of baseball was a state affair not
involving interstate commerce within the meaning of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.29 Justice Holmes, in delivering the opinion of the
Court, stated:
[Although] competitions must be arranged between clubs
from different cities and States ... the transport is a mere
incident, not the essential thing .... [A baseball] exhibi-
tion, although made for money, would not be called trade
or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those
words . . . [since] personal effort, not related to produc-
tion, is not a subject of commerce.30
Due to the nature of the enterprise, the Court exempted baseball
from all antitrust laws.31
24. See Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt.,
Inc., 269 F. 681, 687-88 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (concluding MLB was engaged in inter-
state commerce and had attempted to monopolize and did monopolize part of
that commerce).
25. 149 N.Y.S. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914).
26. See Nat ' League of Prof l Baseball Clubs, 269 F. at 686 (holding injunction
prohibiting baseball player from playing for other baseball team constituted ineq-
uitable contractual practices, but did not violate antitrust laws).
27. Id. at 685.
28. See id.
29. See Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball [sic], which are purely state
affairs. It is true that, in order to attain for these exhibitions the great
popularity that they have achieved, competitions must be arranged be-
tween clubs from different cities and States. But the fact that in order to
give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state
lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to
change the character of the business.
Id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 209 (holding exhibition baseball games for money did not inter-
fere with interstate commerce).
2003]
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The next case in baseball's Supreme Court trilogy was Toolson
v. New York Yankees. 32 George Toolson, a minor league player in the
Yankees farm system, failed to play for the Yankees Eastern League
affiliate after the Yankees International League team demoted
him. 33 Toolson filed a lawsuit alleging antitrust violations and
sought to free himself from the reserve clause of his baseball con-
tract.3 4 He claimed that the clause in his contract, when accompa-
nied by the rules of the Yankees farm system, deprived him of
improved livelihood.35
In a one-page decision, the Supreme Court upheld its prior
decision in Federal Baseball.36 The Court determined that Congress
did not intend to include MLB within the scope of federal antitrust
laws.37 The Court noted that in the thirty years since MLB's incep-
tion, Congress had adequate opportunity to bring the business of
baseball within the reach of federal antitrust law.38 Thus, the busi-
ness developed on the understanding that it was not subject to ex-
isting antitrust legislation.39 The Court ruled that it was the
obligation of Congress to bring baseball within the scope of federal
antitrust law.40
The final case of the baseball trilogy was Flood v. Kuhn.4' In
1969, the St. Louis Cardinals traded all-star outfielder Curt Flood to
the Philadelphia Phillies without obtaining Flood's consent.42
32. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
33. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Toolson
was among baseball players who brought lawsuits against the owners of the New
York and Cleveland professional baseball teams in order to regain his position on
the Yankees International League team. See id.
34. See id. Toolson claimed that professional baseball clubs utilized players'
contracts in order to limit opportunities for professional baseball players to play
with other baseball teams. See id.
35. See id. Toolson asserted that reserve clauses in baseball players' contracts
made professional baseball a monopoly subject to federal antitrust regulation
under the Sherman Antitrust Act. See id.
36. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. (reasserting professional baseball's alleged exemption from anti-
trust regulations because Congress declined to include baseball in antitrust
regulations).
40. See id. (noting Congress must alter federal antitrust regulations in order to
apply antitrust regulations to baseball).
41. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
42. See Wolohan, supra note 11, at 358. Curt Flood never reported to Phila-
delphia in 1970. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 266. Instead, he sat out the year. See id.
After the 1970 season, Flood's rights were sold to the Washington Senators. See id.
Flood agreed to play for Washington in 1971, but retired from baseball on April
27. See id.
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Flood then requested that Commissioner Bowie Kuhn declare him
a free agent.43 As a free agent, Flood would be permitted to negoti-
ate with any major league team. After Kuhn denied his request,
Flood filed a lawsuit claiming that baseball's reserve clauses violated
federal antitrust law.44
In rejecting Flood's claims, the district court and the Second
Circuit determined that Federal Baseball and Toolson were control-
ling.4 5 The Supreme Court ruled that although baseball was a trade
or commerce engaged in interstate commerce, it remained exempt
from antitrust laws. 46 The Court determined that the "longstand-
ing exemption of professional baseball's reserve system from fed-
eral antitrust laws . . . [wa]s an established aberration in which
Congress has acquiesced," and maintained that any inconsistency
was for Congress to clarify. 47 The Court reasoned that Congress's
silence on the issue showed Congress's intent for MLB to escape
the spread of federal antitrust laws.4 8
43. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 265. One of Flood's contentions was that he was not
consulted about the trade beforehand. See id. It was only after the trade was final-
ized that he was informed of the deal by telephone. See id.
44. See Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For the first
time, proponents and opponents of the baseball reserve system hau to argue the
merits of their cases, supported by adequate proof, in a court of law. See id. at 284.
45. See id. at 273 (stating baseball has been national pastime for over century
and should remain structurally intact in order to continue); see also Flood v. Kuhn,
443 F.2d 264, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1971). The district court stated that although the
Federal Baseball and Toolson decisions were "dubious," the Supreme Court should
retain the privilege of overruling its own decisions. See Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. at 278.
46. SeeFlood, 407 U.S. at 285 (indicating remedy was congressional action, not
judicial activism).
47. Id. at 282-83. In support of its decision, the Court noted that "baseball[,]
with full and continuing congressional awareness, has been allowed to develop and
to expand unhindered by federal legislative action." Id. at 283. The Court also
noted that baseball was the only professional sport to have such an exemption. See
id.; see also Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 446 (1957) (ruling NFL was not exempt
from antitrust laws); United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 240 (1955)
(reversing dismissal of antitrust action against individuals and corporations in-
volved in promoting professional championship boxing); Phila. World Hockey
Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (issu-
ing injunction preventing enforcement of reserve clause for professional hockey
players); Wash. Prof'l Basketball Corp. v. NBA, 147 F. Supp. 154, 155 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (holding professional basketball under National Basketball League to be
interstate commerce subject to antitrust regulations under Sherman Antitrust Act).
48. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 285 (citing Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357
(1953)). The Court stated:
Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the [judgment] below
[is] affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs ... so far as that decision
determines that Congress had no intention of including the business of
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.
Id. (citing Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357).
2003]
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B. Post-Baseball Antitrust Trilogy Cases
It is apparent from baseball's Supreme Court trilogy that base-
ball enjoys some form of exemption or immunity from antitrust
laws. The residual question, therefore, is the scope of the exemp-
tion. For example, is the entire business of baseball exempt or is it
simply the rules governing player controls? As the following cases
demonstrate, the courts are divided on this question.
1. A Broad View of Baseball Antitrust Exemption49
Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn ° was the first antitrust case to
challenge the scope of baseball's exemption after the Flood deci-
sion.51 Charles Finley, owner of the Oakland Athletics, sued the
Commissioner of Baseball, Bowie Kuhn, over Kuhn's decision to
void the sale of three Oakland players. 52
In rejecting Finley's antitrust argument, the district court held
that "baseball . . . [was] not subject to the provisions of the [Sher-
man Antitrust] Act."'53 On appeal, Finley argued that any antitrust
exemption professional baseball enjoyed did not apply to the entire
business of baseball, but rather to the reserve system. 54 Conse-
quently, the Seventh Circuit also rejected the argument and held
49. See, e.g., Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th
Cir. 1974) (denying compensation to plaintiffs because settlement agreement
between plaintiff and minor league fulfilled obligation of professional baseball
rules); McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454, 458 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
(finding plaintiff's claims precluded due to antitrust exemption and plaintiff's lack
of standing); New Orleans Pelicans Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'I
Baseball Clubs, No. 93-253, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21468, at *29 (E.D. La. Mar. 1,
1994) (dismissing claims on grounds that antitrust regulation would inhibit
national uniformity in regulating reserve system of baseball and federal antitrust
exemption); Minn. Twins P'ship v. State, 592 N.W.2d 847, 856 (Minn. 1999)
(finding sale and relocation of baseball franchises exempt from state and federal
antitrust laws).
50. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
51. See id. at 541-42 (appealing district court's decision upholding Commis-
sioner's authority to disapprove of player assignments).
52. See id. at 531. Just before the trading deadline of June 15, 1976, Finley
attempted to sell Joe Rudi and Rollie Fingers to the Boston Red Sox for $2 million
and Vida Blue to the New York Yankees for $1.5 million. See id. Finley argued that
he was going to lose Rudi and Fingers to free agency and that he could use the
money to develop new talent. See id.
53. Id. at 540.
54. See id. Finley relied upon two quotations from Justice Blackmun's opinion
in Flood. See id. at 540 n.48. Primarily, he argued that "for the third time in 50
years the Court [wa]s asked specifically to rule that professional baseball's reserve
system [wals within the reach of the federal antitrust laws." Id. at 540 (citing Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 259 (1972)). Finley further argued that "[w]ith its reserve
system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws, baseball [wa]s, in a very
distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly." Id. (citing Flood, 407 U.S. at 282).
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that despite any mention in the Flood case of the reserve system, the
Supreme Court intended to exempt the whole business of baseball
from the federal antitrust laws. 55
Baseball's antitrust immunity was reaffirmed in Professional
Baseball Schools & Clubs v. Kuhn.5 6 The owner of a baseball
franchise in the Carolina League filed a lawsuit challenging the mo-
nopolization of professional baseball by MLB.57 In dismissing the
claims, the Eleventh Circuit, citing baseball's Supreme Court tril-
ogy, found "the exclusion of the business of baseball from the anti-
trust laws ... well established.
58
2. A Narrow View of Baseball Antitrust Exemption
Despite the abundance of decisions made at the Supreme
Court level and other federal levels granting baseball a broad im-
munization from federal antitrust law, some courts rejected the
broad interpretation of Flood as a blanket immunity from antitrust
law for baseball and adopted a more narrow view. Specifically, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
and the Florida Supreme Court gave Flood a mc;e limited
application. 59
In Piazza v. Major League Baseball,60 a Pennsylvania district court
declined to interpret Flood as a broad exemption for baseball in
every aspect of its business dealings. 61 Vincent Piazza and Vincent
Tirendi reached an agreement with Robert Lurie, the owner of the
San Francisco Giants, to purchase the Giants and move the team to
55. See Finley, 569 F.2d at 541. The court cited Flood also for the proposition
that "professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce
... we adhere once again to Federal Baseball and Toolson and to their application to
professional baseball." Id. (citing Flood, 407 U.S. at 282, 284).
56. 693 F.2d 1085 (11th Cir. 1982).
57. See id. at 1085. Specifically, the plaintiff challenged the player assignment
system, franchise location system, the monopolization of the professional baseball
business, and the Carolina League rule that required teams to play games only
with other teams that belonged to the National Association. See id.
58. Id. at 1085-86.
59. See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(ruling that baseball's exemption to federal antitrust laws did not extend beyond
player reserve system); Butterworth v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 644
So. 2d 1021, 1025 (Fla. 1994) (interpreting Flood to exempt only baseball's reserve
system from existing federal antitrust laws).
60. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
61. See id. at 438 (rejecting argument that baseball was exempt from antitrust
liability in present case).
2003]
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Tampa Bay, Florida.6 2 The Ownership Committee of MLB, desir-
ing to keep the franchise in San Francisco, rejected the deal. 63 Af-
ter a frantic search, Robert Lurie sold the Giants to the local group
for $100 million, which was $15 million less than the Piazza and
Tirendi partnership had offered. 64
In their lawsuit, Piazza and Tirendi claimed that baseball mo-
nopolized the MLB team market. 65 They argued MLB "placed di-
rect and indirect restraints on the purchase, sale, transfer,
relocation of, and competition for such teams.''66 Relying on its
broad exemption to federal antitrust law, MLB moved to dismiss
the case. 67
The district court denied the motion and refused to extend
baseball's antitrust exemption to the entire "business of baseball." 68
Rather, the court held Federal Baseball's exemption inapplicable and
limited to baseball's reserve system. 69 In support of its finding, the
62. See id. at 421. The agreement included a provision as to the exclusivity of
the deal. See id. at 422. Lurie agreed to refrain from negotiating with others. See
id.
63. See id. at 423. The Chairman of the Ownership Committee directed Lurie
to consider other offers, which was in violation of Lurie's purchase agreement. See
id.
On September 9, 1992, Bill White, President of the National League, in-
vited George Shinn, a North Carolina resident, to make an alternative bid
to purchase the Giants in order to keep the team in San Francisco. An
alternative offer was ultimately made by other investors to keep the Giants
in San Francisco.
Id.
64. See Peter Gammons, Magowan in San Francisco's Comer, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 1, 1992, at 66. The San Francisco group was headed by Peter Magowan, the
chairman of the Safeway Corp. See id.
65. See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 424. The plaintiffs asserted that "Major League
Baseball [wa]s an unreasonable and unlawful monopoly created, intended and
maintained by defendants for the purpose of permitting defendant team owners,
an intentionally select and limited group, to reap" enormous profits. Id. at 429
n.13.
66. Id. at 424.
67. See id. at 429. The court determined that "[b]aseball's motion to dismiss
focuse[d] solely upon . . . whether plaintiffs adequately plead[ed] that Baseball
acted under color of state law by conspiring with the City of San Francisco." Id. at
428-29 n.l1.
68. See id. at 436 (citing Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 450-53 (1957) (hold-
ing case law, which exempted baseball from antitrust law, was not applicable to
other businesses like NFL)).
69. See id. at 421. The court distinguished the nature of the anticompetitive
activity at issue in Piazza from that of Federal Baseball and resolved that in Piazza, the
anti-competitive activity was in the market for the "sale of ownership interests in
baseball teams .... See id. at 440. The court reasoned that this activity was inap-
posite with that of Federal Baseball, where the anticompetitive activity was in the
market for the exhibition of baseball games. See id. The court found the anti-
competitive market in Piazza to be a "market seemingly as distinguishable from the
game exhibition market as the player transportation market." Id.
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court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Flood for removing
"from Federal Baseball and Toolson any precedential value those cases
may have had beyond the particular facts there involved, i.e., the
reserve clause."70 The Flood decision removed any doubt that base-
ball's exemption from the federal antitrust laws, created by Federal
Baseball, was limited to the reserve clause only.71 The court con-
cluded that because the case did not involve the reserve system,
baseball's conduct was subject to federal antitrust laws. 72
While MLB settled with Piazza prior to the court's final deci-
sion, the legal challenges to the sale of the San Francisco Giants did
not end. In Butterworth v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs,73 the Florida Supreme Court was asked to decide whether
MLB's antitrust immunity exempted all decisions involving the sale
and location of baseball franchises from federal and Florida anti-
trust law.74 The specific focus of the civil investigative demand
("CID") was "[a] combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in
connection with the sale and purchase of the San Francisco Giants
baseball franchise." 75
Faced with the Attorney General's CID, baseball petitioned the
Florida courts to have it set aside. 76 The Florida Supreme Court
was asked to determine the parameters of baseball's antitrust ex-
emption. 77 In particular, the court addressed whether baseball's
antitrust exemption covered decisions involving the sale and loca-
70. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436.
71. See id. (ruling that baseball was engaged in interstate commerce).
72. See id. (emphasizing decisions in Flood and Toolson that exemption lay
solely in reserve system). "Baseball developed ... with the understanding that its
reserve system, not the game generally, was exempt from the antitrust laws." Id.
73. 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
74. See id. at 1021. The court stated:
Section 542.28(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), authorize[d] the Attor-
ney General to issue a civil investigative demand (CID) to any person that
the Attorney General ha[d] reason to believe may be in possession, cus-
tody, or control of documentary material or information relevant to a
civil antitrust investigation. The CIDs may require that person to pro-
duce documents for inspection, to answer written interrogatories, or to
give sworn testimony.
Id. at 1022 n.2.
75. Id. at 1022.
76. See id. (relying on assertion that what was being investigated was transac-
tion exempted from both state and federal antitrust laws).
77. See id. (certifying question to Florida Supreme Court). The circuit court,
with the district court of appeal affirming, stated, "decisions concerning ownership
and location of baseball franchises clearly fall within the ambit of baseball's anti-
trust exemption." Id.
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tion of baseball franchises from federal and Florida antitrust law.78
The Attorney General set forth the argument that the exemption
only applied to the reserve clause system. 79 In opposition, the Na-
tional League argued that baseball's antitrust exemption should be
applied broadly to "the business of baseball."' 0
The Florida Supreme Court held that although Piazza seemed
to contradict federal case law regarding the extent of the exemp-
tion, "none of the other cases ha[d] engaged in such a comprehen-
sive analysis of Flood and its implications." ' Furthermore, the court
ruled that even though the Piazza court was the only federal court
to have interpreted baseball's antitrust exemption so narrowly, the
United States Supreme Court's language in flood supported such an
understanding. 82
Another case rejecting baseball's claim of blanket antitrust im-
munity is Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.8 3
The plaintiff, a female umpire, alleged that MLB had engaged in
employment discrimination. 84 In one of her claims, Postema al-
78. See Buttenvorth, 644 So. 2d at 1021. The court of appeals certified to the
state supreme court the following question "to be one of great public importance:
does the antitrust exemption for baseball recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court in Federal Baseball... and its progeny exempt all decisions involving
the sale and location of baseball franchises from federal and Florida antitrust law?"
Id. at 1021-22.
79. See id. The court answered the certified question as to whether baseball's
antitrust exemption exempted all decisions concerning sales of baseball franchises
from federal and Florida antitrust law in the negative. See id.
80. See id. at 1023. The National League asserted that the sale and location of
the franchises are in the business of baseball. See id.
81. Id. at 1025.
82. See id. (noting that in Flood, Supreme Court reasoned that professional
baseball was engaged in interstate commerce, directly contradicting reasoning in
Federal Baseball, which held that baseball exhibitions were "purely state affairs"). It
"defied legal logic and common sense" that baseball would have such a broad judi-
cially created antitrust exemption, while all other professional sports did not. See
id. at 1026 (Overton, J., concurring). For examples of antitrust exemption peti-
tions in other sports, see Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 446 (1957) (holding anti-
trust laws apply to business of professional football); United States v. Int'l Boxing
Club, 348 U.S. 236, 240 (1955) (holding presentation of live exhibitions actionable
as violations of antitrust law); Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (finding NHL could not assert
exemption from antitrust laws as affirmative defense); Wash. Prof'l Basketball
Corp. v. NBA, 147 F. Supp. 154, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (reserving right to decide
question of federal antitrust statute concerning alleged interference with right to
engage in professional basketball business).
83. 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60, 62
(2d Cir. 1993).
84. See id. at 1477 (stating plaintiffs claim was common law restraint of trade).
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leged that baseball's conduct violated antitrust laws. 8 5 The district
court rejected baseball's claim of blanket antitrust immunity on
grounds other than antitrust exemptions.86 The court found that
while "the baseball exemption immunize [d] baseball from antitrust
challenges to its league structure and its reserve system, the exemp-
tion d[id] not provide baseball with blanket immunity ... in every
context in which it operates. '87 It reached this decision after hold-
ing that the Supreme Court decision in Flood was an "endorsement
of a limited view of the exemption."88
3. Reaffirming a Broad View of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
The willingness of the courts to limit baseball's antitrust ex-
emption in Piazza, Butterworth, and Postema has not become the rule.
A federal district court, interpreting the Supreme Court trilogy, ex-
tended the antitrust exemption to the entire business of baseball in
McCoy v. Major League Baseball.89 In McCoy, a group of fans and busi-
ness owners brought an antitrust action against MLB, stemming
from the owners' alleged unfair labor practice throughout the 1994
strike. 90
85. See id. at 1489 (finding baseball enjoys immunity from antitrust challenges
to its league structure and its reserve system).
86. See id. The court determined that the "baseball exemption d[id] not en-
compass umpire employment relations." Id. Therefore, the claims by Postema
were not preempted. See id. The court noted that the antitrust exemption did not
provide baseball with blanket immunity for anti-competitive behavior in every con-
text in which baseball operates. See id.
87. Id.
88. See Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1489.
89. 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995). The federal district court found that
[i]n spite of repeated invitations by the high court to invalidate the rule, Congress
has chosen not to repeal the judicially created antitrust exemption." Id. at 458.
Accordingly, the court applied the antitrust exemption established by Federal Base-
ball, Toolson, and Flood. See id.
90. See id. The court summarized the facts of McCoy, stating:
On December 31, 1993, the collective bargaining agreement between the
twenty-eight Major League Clubs (the "Owners") and the Major League
Baseball Players Association (the "Players Association") expired. When
the Owners and the Players Association were unable to agree on a new
contract, the players went on strike, resulting in the cancellation of the
remainder of the 1994 major league baseball season, the 1994 World Se-
ries, and a portion of the 1995 season.
The Owners and the Players Association each filed unfair labor practice
charges with the National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB"). The
NLRB filed a complaint against the Owners alleging an unfair labor prac-
tice and seeking a temporary injunction pursuant to Section 10(j) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). Finding reasonable
cause for the NLRB to conclude that the Owners had engaged in an un-
fair labor practice, a district court granted a temporary injunction to pre-
serve the status quo .... The injunction reinstated the terms of the
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The district court granted MLB's motion for dismissal and re-
jected the Piazza court's interpretation that baseball's antitrust ex-
emption only applied to baseball's reserve system.91 Following an
examination of baseball's Supreme Court trilogy, the McCoy court
found that the antitrust exemption encompassed the entire busi-
ness of baseball. 92 The court noted that the "great weight of au-
thority" recognized that the antitrust exemption covers the entire
business, and that until Congress or the Supreme Court sees fit to
alter the rule, the exemption covers the industry of baseball. 93
III. RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTION ON BASEBALL
Although there is a split in the judiciary as to the scope of base-
ball's antitrust exemption, the courts all agree that Congress should
pass legislation addressing the issue. Nonetheless, while Congress
has conducted numerous hearings on the issue, it has done little to
provide the courts with much guidance.
A. The Curt Flood Act of 1998
As part of the 1997 Collective Bargaining Agreement ("Basic
Agreement") between MLB and MLBPA, both sides agreed that
they would jointly request and lobby for legislation to clarify
expired collective bargaining agreement until (1) a new agreement is
reached, (2) the NLRB renders a final disposition of the related adminis-
trative matter currently pending, or (3) the district court finds that the
parties are at an impasse.
Id. at 455.
91. See id. at 457 (stating antitrust exemption goes beyond reserve system).
Piazza relied on Flood in reaching its decision that the exemption solely applies to
the reserve system, yet forwent mentioning "Congress had no intention of includ-
ing the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws." Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (citing Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357
(1953)).
92. See McCoy, 911 F. Supp. at 458 (applying antitrust exemption established
by Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood).
93. See id. Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' standing to bring an
action. See id. Antitrust standing was given to "any person ... injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... Id.
(quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp. 1995)).
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whether professional baseball players were covered under antitrust
law.94 The result of this joint effort was the Curt Flood Act.95
A crucial aspect of the Curt Flood Act, which amended the
Clayton Act,96 is that only Major League Baseball players have
standing to sue. 97 The Act covers antitrust issues involving major
league players, but specifically excludes Minor League Baseball, the
amateur draft, the relationship between the major leagues and the
94. Article XXVIII of the 1997 Basic Agreement between Major League Base-
ball and the Major League Baseball Players Association - Antitrust states:
The Clubs and the Association will jointly request and cooperate in lobby-
ing the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that Major League Baseball
Players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that Major League Play-
ers will have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do other profes-
sional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players), along with a
provision that makes it clear that the passage of that bill does not change
the application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect
to any other person or entity.
Basic Agreement Between Major League Baseball and Major League Baseball Play-
ers Association, effective Jan. 1, Art. XXVIII, at 106-07 (on file with author).
95. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2826 (1998) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 27a (2000)) (stating purpose of Act is to include
players into antitrust law coverage).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2000).
97. See Curt Flood Act § 3. The stated purpose of the Act is to grant Major
League Baseball players the same coverage under the antitrust laws as other profes-
sional athletes, such as football and basketball players. See id. 15 U.S.C. § 27a, the
codified version, states that:
Only a major league baseball player has standing to sue under this sec-
tion. For the purposes of this section, a major league baseball player is-
(1) a person who is a party to a major league player's contract, or is play-
ing baseball at the major league level; or
(2) a person who was a party to a major league player's contract or play-
ing baseball at the major league level at the time of the injury that is the
subject of the complaint; or
(3) a person who has been a party to a major league player's contract or
who has played baseball at the major league level, and who claims he has
been injured in his efforts to secure a subsequent major league player's
contract by an alleged violation of the antitrust laws: Provided however,
That for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged antitrust violation
shall not include any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in
the business of organized professional baseball relating to or affecting
employment to play baseball at the minor league level, including any or-
ganized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any re-
serve clause as applied to minor league players; or
(4) a person who was a party to a major league player's contract or who
was playing baseball at the major league level at the conclusion of the last
full championship season immediately preceding the expiration of the
last collective bargaining agreement between persons in the business of
organized professional major league baseball and the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of major league baseball players.
15 U.S.C. § 27a (emphasis added).
2003]
15
Wolohan: Major League Baseball Contraction and Antitrust Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
20 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
minors, franchise relocation, intellectual property, the Sports
Broadcasting Act, and umpires from coverage. 98
For the purposes of contraction, the key sections and provi-
sions of the Curt Flood Act can be found in section 3 and its subsec-
tions. Section 3, entitled "Application of the Antitrust Laws to
Professional Major League Baseball," provides:
[T] he conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons99
in the business of organized professional major league
baseball directly relating to or affecting employment of
major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same
extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would
be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in
any other professional sports business affecting interstate
commerce.
100
Although it intended to provide MLB players with the antitrust
protections that their colleagues enjoy in other professional sports,
the Act may cover contraction. l0 As stated before, "the conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organ-
ized professional major league baseball relating to or affecting em-
ployment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the
major league level are subject to the antitrust laws."'1 2 By eliminat-
ing two teams, the Commissioner, a person in the business of or-
98. See Curt Flood Act § 3 (excluding certain groups and persons from stand-
ing to sue).
99. The Act defines "person" as: "[A]ny entity, including an individual, part-
nership, corporation, trust, or unincorporated association or any combination or
association thereof. As used in this section, the National Association of Profes-
sional Baseball Leagues, its member leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are not
'in the business of organized professional major league baseball.'" Id.
100. Id. § 2.
101. See id. Due to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Pro
Football Inc., the impact the Curt Flood Act will have on labor relations between
MLB and the MLBPA is probably going to be very little. See Brown, 518 U.S. 231,
250 (1996). In Brown, a group of professional football players challenged the right
of the NFL to fix unilaterally the salary of all players assigned to a team's develop-
mental squad once an impasse was reached in the collective bargaining process.
See id. In upholding the NFL's right to impose unilaterally conditions on its em-
ployees, the Supreme Court ruled that the league's conduct in fixing the salary for
developmental squad players fell within the scope of non-statutory labor exemp-
tion from antitrust liability. See id. The labor exemption allows parties involved in
the collective bargaining to engage in conduct that is authorized by labor laws
without fear of being sued under antitrust law by the other party for their conduct.
See id. Therefore, due to the existence of a union, the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion bars the players from filing any antitrust claims. See id.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 27a(a) (2000); Curt Flood Act § 3.
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ganized professional Major League Baseball, clearly affects the
employment of at least fifty Major League Baseball players. There-
fore, it appears that any player affected by contraction would be
covered under this section of the Curt Flood Act.
Another section of the Act providing text relevant to the issue
of contraction can be found in section 27a(b) (3) of the Clayton
Act.10 3 The section exempts from coverage under the Curt Flood
Act: "any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons engag-
ing in, conducting or participating in the business of organized pro-
fessional baseball relating to or affecting franchise expansion,
location or relocation, franchise ownership issues, including owner-
ship transfers, the relationship between the Office of the Commis-
sioner and franchise owners .. ."104
In light of the Piazza and Butterworth litigations, there are two
ways the courts can interpret section 27a(b) (3).105 The primary ap-
proach is that Congress inserted this clause for the specific purpose
of challenging the decisions in Piazza and Butterworth.10 6 By specifi-
cally excluding franchise and ownership issues, Congress intended
to protect MLB from future antitrust lawsuits "affecting franchise
expansion, location or relocation, [and] franchise ownership
issues."10 7
The second interpretation is that Congress wanted to include
franchise and ownership issues under federal antitrust law because
it failed to overturn Piazza explicitly. This argument is supported by
the language at the beginning of section 27a(b), which mandates
"[n] o court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a basis for
changing the application of the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements other than those set forth .... -108 The
legislative history of the Curt Flood Act makes it clear that the Act
"is absolutely neutral with respect to the state of the antitrust laws
between all entities and in all circumstances other than in the area
of employment as between major league owners and players."' 0 9 In
addition, Senator Hatch emphasized that the Curt Flood Act did
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 27a(b)(3) (governing contraction issues).
104. Id.; see also Curt Flood Act § 3(b) (3).
105. For a discussion of the facts of Piazza and the impact of the holding, see
supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Butterworth and the
impact of that case, see supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
106. See generally Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001: Hear-
ing on H.R 3288 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 27a(b) (3); Curt Flood Act § 3(b)(3).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 27a(b).
109. 144 CONG. REc. S9494-9498 (daily ed. July 30, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
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not attempt to overrule current case law, except to the extent that
courts exempted baseball from antitrust regulations when dealing
with MLB players. 110
B. Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001
Frustrated by baseball's plans of contraction, Congress intro-
duced another piece of legislation in November 2001 entitled the
"Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001"
("FANS").111 Introduced by Senator Paul Wellstone, a Minnesota
Democrat, and Representative John Conyers of Michigan, FANS at-
tempted to amend the Clayton Act to make the antitrust laws appli-
cable to the elimination or relocation of Major League Baseball
franchises.112
110. See id. ("Whatever the law was the day before this bill passes in those
other areas it will continue to be after the bill passes."). The Judiciary Committee
also noted "both the parties[, major league baseball and the MLBPA,] and the
Committee agree that Congress is taking no position on the current state of the
law one way or the other." Id.
111. H.R. 3288, 107th Cong. (2001). The Act was introduced on November
14, 2001. See id. One bill, S 1704 IS, was introduced in the Senate while another,
HR 3288 IH, was introduced in the House of Representatives. See S. 1704, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 3288, 107th Cong. (2001).
112. See S. 1704; H.R. 3288. Section 3 of the Curt Flood Act, "Application of
the Antitrust Laws to Professional Major League Baseball," states in pertinent part:
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12 et seq.) is amended-
(1) by redesignating section 27, as added by the Curt Flood Act of 1998
(Public Law 105-297), as section 28, and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
Section 29.
(a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct, acts, prac-
tices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized professional
major league baseball directly relating to or affecting the elimination or
relocation of a major league baseball franchise are subject to the antitrust
laws to the same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any
other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce.
(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a basis for
changing the application of the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts, prac-
tices, or agreements other than those set forth in subsection (a). This
section does not create, permit, or imply a cause of action by which to
challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply the antitrust laws
to, any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that do not directly relate
to or affect the elimination or relocation of a major league baseball
franchise, including but not limited to-
(1) the agreement between organized professional major
league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the 'Professional
Baseball Agreement,' the relationship between organized profes-
sional major league baseball and organized professional minor
league baseball, or any other matter relating to organized profes-
sional baseball's minor leagues;
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Designed after the Curt Flood Act, the intent of FANS is to
make:
[T]he conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
in the business of organized professional major league
baseball directly relating to or affecting the elimination or
relocation of a major league baseball franchise.., subject
to the antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust
laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional
sports business affecting interstate commerce."13
Like the Curt Flood Act, courts are prohibited from relying on
FANS to "create, permit, or imply a cause of action by which to
challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply the antitrust
laws to, any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that do not di-
rectly relate to or affect the elimination or relocation of a major
league baseball franchise."'1 4 Also similar to the Curt Flood Act,
FANS specifically excludes from coverage any antitrust issues involv-
ing Minor League Baseball, intellectual property, the Sports Broad-
casting Act, and any person not in the business of organized
professional Major League Baseball. 115
IV. APPLYING ANTITRUST LAW TO BASEBALL'S CONTRACTION
Shortly after baseball announced its plan to contract two teams
before the start of the 2002 season, Attorney General of Florida
Robert Butterworth issued CIDs to MLB, its Commissioner, and the
(2) any conduct, act, practice, or agreement of a person engag-
ing in, conducting, or participating in the business of organized pro-
fessional baseball relating to or affecting the relationship between
the Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners, the marketing
or sales of the entertainment product of organized professional base-
ball, and the licensing of intellectual property rights owned or held
by organized professional baseball teams individually or collectively;
(3) any conduct, act, practice, or agreement protected by Pub-
lic Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961'); and(4) any conduct, act, practice, or agreement of a person not in
the business of organized professional major league baseball.
S. 1704 § 3; H.R. 3288 § 3.
113. S. 1704 § 3; H.R. 3288 § 3.
114. S. 1704 § 3; H.R. 3288 § 3.
115. See S. 1704 § 3(b)(1)-(4); H.R. 3288 at § 3(b)(1)-(4). Section 3(b)(1)
excludes the minor leagues from antitrust coverage. See S. 1704 § 3 (b) (1). Section
3(b) (2) excludes intellectual property, section 3(b)(3) covers actions under the
Sports Broadcasting Act, and section 3(b) (4) deals with persons not in the business
of baseball. See id. § 3(b) (2)-(4).
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two Florida Major League Baseball clubs.116 The purpose of the
CIDs was to investigate possible violations of the federal and state
antitrust laws."17 In an attempt to stop the examination, MLB
sought a court order seeking "declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Attorney General on the grounds that the 'business of
baseball,' including the decision whether to contract, is exempt
from the federal and state antitrust laws." 118
The district court in Major League Baseball v. Buttenorth re-
viewed the Supreme Court's decisions regarding baseball's antitrust
exemption to reaffirm that only Congress could terminate base-
ball's exemption.' 19 Therefore, with respect to the issue of whether
contraction was part of the "business of baseball," the court held
that "[i]t [was] difficult to conceive of a decision more integral to
the business of major league baseball than the number of clubs that
will be allowed to compete."' 20 The court ruled that the basic
league structure, including the number of teams, remained an es-
sential feature of the business of baseball and thereby exempted it
from the antitrust laws.121
116. See Murray Chass, Legislators Are Seeking to Limit Antitrust Exemption for Ma-
jors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, S3. The Attorney General argued that even if the
Florida Marlins and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays were not subject to contraction, the
State of Florida still had an economic interest because the Expos and the Twins
both have spring training camps in Florida. See id.
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 (c) (1) (2000) (stating CIDs may be issued if Com-
mission has reason to believe information may be available "relevant to unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce").
118. Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1318 (N.D.
Fla. 2001).
119. See id. at 1330. The court upheld the precedent set in Federal Baseball and
Toolson and reiterated the principle that only Congress had the power to terminate
baseball's antitrust exemption. See id.
120. Id. at 1332.
121. See id. The court stated:
The Attorney General assert[ed] that the contraction decision may have
been motivated by economic (and indeed anti-competitive) concerns
rather than concern for the nature and quality of the game. For two
reasons, this d[id] not help the Attorney General. First, the applicability
of the antitrust exemption d[id] not turn on whether any antitrust claim
would otherwise be well founded; the whole point is that the antitrust
laws do not apply, thus exempting even anti-competitive conduct from
liability. Second, the Attorney General's apparent assertion that econom-
ics, on the one hand, and the nature and quality of the game, on the
other, are wholly separate concerns [wa]s obviously incorrect; at least dat-
ing to the sale of Babe Ruth by the Red Sox, the interplay between eco-
nomics and the nature and quality of the game has been obvious. It
would be irrational for club owners to ignore economics, which in the
long run (and probably the short) necessarily will impact the nature and
quality of the game; and it would be irrational to ignore the nature and
quality of the game, which in the long run (and probably the short) will
impact economics. Any assertion that club owners should, could or ever
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As for the application of the Florida Antitrust Act, the court
ruled that the Florida Antitrust Act explicitly exempted any subject
matter that is exempt under federal law.122 Additionally, the court
noted that "any effort to apply the Florida Antitrust Act to the busi-
ness of baseball would remain invalid even if the Act by its terms did
not incorporate the federal exemption" because of the Supreme
Court decision in Flood v. Kuhn.123 The Flood Court held that "state
antitrust laws could not be applied to the business of baseball be-
cause state antitrust regulation would conflict with federal policy,
would prevent needed national uniformity in the regulation of
baseball, and thus would run afoul of the Commerce Clause."'124
The court concluded that the business of baseball, including the
right to contract, escaped the range of federal and state antitrust
regulations.1 25
The Florida Attorney General's basic argument centered on
the premise that regardless of the merits, MLB is bound by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Butterworth v. National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs.126 Once again, in that case, the court
held that the long recognized exemption of the business of baseball
applied only to the reserve clause, not the entire business of base-
ball. 127 In comparing the two cases, the district court ruled that
because the parties (the National League and its President versus
Major League Baseball and its Commissioner) and the issues (appli-
cability of the antitrust laws to the 1994 proposed sale and transfer
of the Giants to Florida versus the applicability of the antitrust laws
to the 2002 proposed contraction of the major leagues) were differ-
did make a decision on the number of clubs in the league without consid-
ering both economics and other factors affecting the nature and quality
of the game would be wholly fanciful.
Id. n.18.
122. See Major League Baseball, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1333 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 542.20 (West 2001)). The Florida Antitrust Act provides that "[a]ny activity of
conduct exempt under Florida statutory or common law or exempt from the provi-
sions of the antitrust laws of the United States is exempt from the provisions of this
chapter." Id.
123. Id.; see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 273 (1972) (citing prior case law
to establish lack of congressional intent to encompass baseball in federal antitrust
laws).
124. Major League Baseball, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1333 (citing Flood, 407 U.S. at
284).
125. See id. at 1334 (quoting Flood Court's summation of state's application of
federal and state antitrust laws).
126. 644 So. 2d. 1021 (Fla. 1994).
127. See id. at 1025 (holding that baseball's antitrust exemption only applied
to reserve system).
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ent, the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar the action. 128
The court noted that the:
[I]rony in the Attorney General's assertion now that But-
terworth - a decision in which the Florida Supreme Court
accepted the Attorney General's assertion that the anti-
trust exemption must be evaluated issue by issue - fore-
closes consideration of whether the antitrust exemption
applies to yet another issue, the proposed contraction
from thirty clubs to twenty-eight. 29
V. CONCLUSION
What is the status of baseball's antitrust exemption? How do
the Curt Flood Act and the FANS Act affect contraction? The short
answer to these questions is that baseball's antitrust exemption is
stronger then ever. In the words of the court in Major League Base-
ball v. Butterworth,130 "the business of baseball is exempt; the exemp-
tion was well established long prior to adoption of the Curt Flood
Act and certainly was not repealed by that Act."131
In the past four years, Congress has had two opportunities to
repeal baseball's antitrust immunity or to clarify the judicial debate
over the extent of the exemption.132 Though it failed to take ad-
vantage of either opportunity, Congress's silence has sent a strong
message. In the absence of contrary legislation, the Curt Flood Act
continues to stand for the proposition that the entire business of
baseball, except for "the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of
persons in the business of organized professional major league
baseball directly relating to or affecting employment of major
league baseball players" is exempt from antitrust law. 133
128. See Major League Baseball, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 (noting that collateral
estoppel did not prohibit particular action).
129. Id.
130. 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1318 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
131. Id. at 1331 n.16 (discussing how adoption of Curt Flood Act represents
endorsement of baseball's antitrust exemption).
132. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3, 112 Stat. 2824, 2826
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 27a (2000)) (defining extent of exemption);
Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001, S. 1704, 107th Cong.
§ 3 (2001); H.R. 3288, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001).
133. Curt Flood Act § 3; see also Major League Baseball, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
In fact, this was one of the arguments used in Major League Baseball when baseball
asserted "that the Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 27a, adopted in 1998, constitutes an
endorsement by Congress of the exemption of the business of baseball." Id. at
1331 n.16. Although the court rejected this argument and found no such intent
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The assertion that contraction affects the employment of Ma-
jor League Baseball players, thereby triggering coverage under the
Curt Flood Act, should be rejected.134 As the court in Major League
Baseball held, "properly construed, th[e] [Curt Flood Act] does not
affect the issues in ... [contraction] one way or the other, because
Congress explicitly indicated its intention not to affect issues other
than direct employment matters.' 3 5 In addition, Congress's intro-
duction of FANS legislation makes it impossible to argue that Con-
gress intended to include contraction and other franchise issues
under the federal antitrust law. 136 FANS makes it clear that Con-
gress does not believe contraction is covered by the Curt Flood Act
or is subject to federal antitrust law.13 7
FANS attempted to make "agreements ... directly relating to
or affecting the elimination or relocation of a major league baseball
franchise . . . subject to the antitrust laws.' 38 With contraction
postponed, talks in Congress have stalled and passage now seems
likely only if the owners actually do contract two teams. 139 Unfortu-
nately, in the following years, it will probably be too late to save the
two franchises. In conclusion, without the passage of FANS, anyone
wishing to prevent contraction will have to look beyond the federal
antitrust laws for direction.
on the part of Congress, the court ultimately held that the entire business of base-
ball was exempt from federal and state antitrust law. See id. at 1334.
134. See Patrick Reusse, Soccer Is Contraction's Ugly Remnant, STAR TRIB., Dec. 9,
2001, at 2C. It should be noted that contraction affects the front-office staff, sta-
dium vendors, concessionaires, minor league players, and all other ancillary peo-
ple and businesses that depend on the franchise for a living.
135. Major League Baseball, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1331 n.6.
136. See S. 1704 § 3; H.R. 3288 § 3 (exhibiting no legislative intent to include
contraction or franchise issues under federal antitrust law).
137. See S. 1704 § 3; H.R. 3288 § 3 (excluding contraction from antitrust
exemption).
138. S. 1704 § 3(a); H.R. 3288 § 3(a).
139. It does not help that the former owner of the Texas Rangers, George W.
Bush, now sits in the White House. See Mark Asher, Legislation to Challenge Antitrust
Exemption, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2001, at D02 (stating Senator Leahy reached out
to Bush for support on bill).
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